Neither are we directly told anything about the authors of the papers (1), although a quick on-line check reveals that with the exception of the editors themselves who contribute a paper each, they come from universities as far apart as Strasbourg (two authors), Istanbul, Mexico and Helsinki. Unusually, in the book itself we are told nothing directly about the editors either, although a check with the publisher's website reveals that Eric Lemaire is at the University of Burgundy and Jesus Padilla Galvez is a Professor in the University of Castilla-La Mancha in Toledo. Although the volume is advertised as having 150 pages, this resolves into 142 pages of actual text together with two pages which provide a listing of Wittgenstein's works with the usual abbreviations. There is no index.
If it already appears that this book seems rather expensive considering its length and some lack of attention to detail, readers will be disappointed to find that an equal lack of consideration is often paid to basic English spelling and grammar, a fact made more glaring with the recognition that the editors are more often than not the main culprits. Taken at random within the first paragraph or two of the Introduction, we are presented with the following:
On the one hand, in philosophy we ask important or fundamental questions about the nature of human beings, the existence or inexistence [sic.] of God, values we should follow in our life, the limits of our knowledge and so on. We want 1 that these questions do not remained [sic.] unanswered while, on the other hand, as P. van Inwagen notices, that they [sic.] are no established facts or theories in philosophy, no normal philosophy (Ibid., 7).
Surely this could have been easily avoided with the proper scrutiny. The Introduction dwells on Wittgenstein as the radical instigator of a new method that takes philosophical problems to be the result of misuses of language which require a non-theoretical response in the form of an appropriate diagnosis and cure:
Is it consistent for a philosopher to hold that philosophical problems are non-sense ? How should we cure our understanding from philosophical diseases ? What is the correct methodology to pursue this therapy ? Is this cure purely destructive or not ? Was Wittgenstein's practice really faithful to his aims ? Was his philosophy really opposed to tradition ? (Ibid., 8).
Advising that Wittgenstein addresses a wide variety of topics in his work, the spectrum 'ranging from mathematics to the analysis of ethical problems' (Ibid.) the editors reveal that the aim of the book is to examine a broad range of these problems: Wittgenstein's writings are relevant to the 'social sciences, morphology, metaphysics, private language and the so-called hinge-prepositions [sic.]', not to mention Lars Hertzberg's topic of Wittgenstein's ethnological approach and the final technical paper on Godel and metalogic by Padilla Galvez.
The first paper in the book, Michel Le Du of Strasbourg's 'Tacit Knowledge and Action', is described by the editors as an attempt to analyse the grammar of the concept of understanding, and this would appear to be confirmed by Le Du when he claims that Wittgenstein's remarks on this topic 'are scattered in many different places and difficult to catch in one single grasp' (Ibid., 11). It then seems as if the reason for exploring this concept within the social sciences is that this is a field in which it has a clear and specific application, as if it were merely incidental to the investigation that this field be chosen rather than some other. But as Le Du emphasises at the beginning, the purpose of 2 the paper is to explore the relevance and importance of Wittgenstein's legacy for the social sciences, an aim which leads him to discuss the underlying presuppositions that govern the work of two particular sociologists, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. Peter Winch is then introduced as someone who harbours an idea said to be borrowed by Giddens, viz., that the kind of understanding that agents have of their actions is not just contingently related to the actions that they undertake, but is constitutive of those that they go on to perform (Ibid., 15).
The distinction which Le Du draws here is expressed in another guise when he argues, following Peter Winch, that whilst the relationship between the fall of an apple and the concept of gravitation is external, the relationship between pain and pain-behaviour is internal because in this case one acts as a criterion for the occurrence of the other. This is a superior example to that which is introduced by Winch himself, contra Popper, viz., that the role of the concept of war is not to explain what happens when societies come into armed conflict. Rather, for Winch 'It is an idea which provides the criteria of what is appropriate in the behaviour of members of the conflicting societies'. Yet there remains a clear sense in which Popper is correct. That there is a state of War between two nations 'explains' why they are at odds by pointing towards the political framework against which the armed conflict arises, a conflict that can erupt even without a declaration of war. We might, for example, be observing only a series of skirmishes which could end in reconciliation without leading to war at all. Furthermore, it seems strained for Winch to claim (2) that when my country is at war there are certain things which I must and must not do because the concept of war is essential to my behaviour, when I may not even feel inclined to join the affray. There is a distinction to be drawn here between the descriptive and the prescriptive. It is not entirely clear whether Le Du would agree with this rejoinder to Winch. On the one hand, he imagines a situation which would in normal circumstances be said to be one of war even if the participating 'belligerent agents' were reluctant to describe themselves as warriors; yet he appears to sanction the claim that if you are a member of a belligerent country and (presumably) behave in a belligerent way, then 'this concept essentially participates in your behaviour' (Ibid., 16). As for the related claim (Ibid., Footnote 9) that having the concept of a soldier is part of what it is to be a soldier, it is hard to see what this amounts to beyond its rehearsal of the platitude that adopting the role of a soldier would normally be understood to go along with an understanding of the concept.
Le Du, then, subscribes to the idea that there is what he calls a 'methodological separatism' between the social and the natural sciences (Ibid.,11), a distinction he endeavours to explain in terms of the difference between the hidden (explanatory) structure of a water molecule and the structure of a (social) world of agents who act in accordance with an understanding whichhe clearly intends to emphasise -is fully open to view. This manifestly Wittgensteinian framework, however, should be distinguished from an 'objectivist' approach which he describes as follows:
In such a perspective, the structures appear as patterns or types of relations one can oberve [sic.] in different social contexts and the concept of structure seems to be naturally connected with what has been called the 'objectivist' approach in social sciences. As Giddens emphasises, the difficulty raised by such a notion is that 'the structure then appears as a constraint which is "external" to action'. (Ibid., 13 quoting Giddens).
Le Du continues by emphasising the Wittgensteinian credentials of what he refers to as the double hermeneutics posture of sociologists like Giddens, viz., that within the social sciences only concepts that agents themselves master are fit for an explanatory purpose. Nevertheless, he takes Giddens to adhere to the notion of a tacit grasp of a rule that results in a muddle, because Giddens is said to operate with a notion of unformulated rules the text of which he inwardly consults, and this proposal is contrary to the Wittgensteinian idea that understanding of rules is shown in the capacity to act in accordance with them. He goes on to discuss, amongst other things, rules when they become second nature, e.g., the chess player who does not give reasons for his moves, so that he acts effortlessly, 'mechanically', 'blindly', ideas which are in accord with Wittgenstein's proposals as opposed to what Le Du identifies in cognitive science as the notion of a mechanism divorced from action: applying the rule in these kinds of cases makes no sense.
Whilst Le Du's paper suffers occasionally from the odd mis-spelling and grammatical fault of the kind already mentioned, the reader is generally able to obtain a fair idea of where it is going. It certainly does remind us, especially in regard to Winch, However, there are obvious pitfalls to this rather neat account, and Plaud discovers the main difficulty to lie in Goethe's search for the Urphanomen or 'primal phenomenon', e.g., the 'primal plant' or Urpflanze as the common ancestor to all species of plants. Not only is this idea quite useless as a verifiable hypothesis, a point which is in one way incidental to Plaud's analysis, but it also goes quite against the grain of Wittgenstein's avowed rejection of what she refers to as 'primal pictures' or 'paradigms'. Quoting § 115, Plaud argues forcefully that there can 5 be no place in Wittgenstein's philosophy for the kinds of pictures which hold us captive as the source of our philosophical problems, even if Goethe's approach to the phenomena has a power over Wittgenstein because he perceives it to be highly relevant to his own endeavours. Plaud discovers a resolution of the paradox in the rejection of the idea that the Urphanomen, e.g., the Urpflanze, should be regarded as an historical ancestor to all plants, as distinct from being a mere 'prototype' or idea setting the phenomena in some kind of order. Not only would this historical interpretation make the Urpflantze useless as a verifiable hypothesis, but it would also be seen to be performing the kind of misleading role that Wittgenstein rejects. Indeed, as Schiller is said to have remarked on having had the model of the Urpflantze explained to him by Goethe in 1793, 'That is not an experience, it is an idea !' Schiller immediately grasps that the proper function of the concept is regulative rather than historical, so that it cannot therefore be seen to be performing any proper scientific causal role in an explanation of the phenomena.
Sabine Plaud regards Goethe as someone who comes through time to acknowledge this role of the Urpflanze as 'a mere theoretical archetype' (Ibid., 42), so that a strictly methodological and regulative use of Urbilder as proper synoptic perspectives on the phenomena, is entirely in keeping with Wittgenstein's use of language-games as a means of throwing light on the ways in which language is used in order to dispel the power that philosophical problems exert.
Plaud interestingly extends her analysis to Wittgenstein's treatment of Sir James George
Frazer in his Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, where Wittgenstein asserts that the material Frazer has collected points to some unknown law, a 'law' which can be seen either as an 'hypothesis of development' or as 'nothing but a way of expressing a formal connection'. But Frazer, with Spengler, together misinterpret the 'laws' they 'discover' in the described phenomena, wrongly taking their realistic interpretations, following Goethe's earlier lead, to yield significant historical theories about cultural and social evolution. Yet, on Wittgenstein's view, all that these thinkers are really doing is misusing a methodological tool whenever they become mesmerised by the pictures that this tool enables them to draw, because it leads them to paint realistic portrayals of how societies have evolved. 6 his own purposes, re-evaluating the approach to 'primal phenomena' in order to make it more compatible with his own methodology. Goethe, in addition, is shown by Plaud to have been rather keen to betray his adherence to a Platonistic outlook by demonstrating the need for a primal plant by asking how such a model could possibly fail to apply if he can in fact recognise this or that item as a plant. Sabine Plaud's paper manages to provide an extremely interesting and thought-provoking account in a field which has already been fairly well ploughed in the secondary literature. Definitely one not to be missed. It is also largely free of the grammatical and spelling errors already mentioned (but cf. 'appeareances' [sic.], 45). There are, however, two ways of approaching these questions, the first of which is to directly examine Wittgenstein's texts, and the second of which is to study what has been said by his interpreters. Although these strategies could be combined, Lemaire within the space available to him chooses to follow the second course.
Beginning with David Stern's distinction, following Robert Fogelin, between 'Pyrrhonian' readings of the Investigations which see it as desiring to bring philosophy to a close, and 'nonPyrrhonian' readings which see it as criticising existing theories in order to improve upon them, he instances Peter Hacker as an exponent of the latter kind of reading, and Diamond & Conant as exponents of the former. However, he first of all asks how 'metaphysics' is to be defined, and
his first attempt at a definition is as follows: ...a certain picture has long dominated the history of metaphysics.
And metaphysics should not be mistaken for this picture. Though it has not been accepted by all philosophers, it nevertheless seems to have been prevailing at least in the modern period. This picture depicts
Metaphysics as a completely a priori, absolutely incredulous or self-critical science which aims, 1. at discovering absolute truths about the necessary structure of reality and, 2. at providing particular sciences and possibly common sense with an indestructible foundation, in order to preserve them from scepticism (Ibid., 51). Yet Lemaire would answer Hacker by claiming that Hacker is being inconsistent in regarding his own reference to 'knowledge about our conceptual scheme' as knowledge which is not itself metaphysical. Lemaire cannot really have in mind here a Strawsonian idea of a form of metaphysics which is descriptive rather than explanatory, since that would just not fit the bill in the kind of case he is presenting. The problem he raises is that if any expression of the platitude that human beings ordinarily talk both about their world and about themselves, is to be construed as embodying a kind of metaphysical claim, then claims which are not metaphysical are clearly going to be difficult to find. Lemaire has nevertheless performed a useful service by drawing our attention to the salient point that talk about human beings going about their day-to-day business and talk about human beings as only physical or biological mechanisms, usually takes place in different contexts for quite different purposes. But this means that there is no immediate reason for concluding that talk within these different kinds of contexts must lead to some form of contradiction, which it would have to do were it construed as being in some way talk which inherently provided the grounds for making opposing metaphysical claims.
Yet the anthropocentric outlook which is central to Wittgenstein's method begins from the premise that ordinary human behaviour in ordinary circumstances is the point of departure
for philosophical reflection insofar as this expression has any meaning, so that the philosopher who claims that 'there are really no physical objects' or that 'there is really no justification for believing in other minds' has to be regarded as being subject to the demands of a misleading picture which accompanies our everyday thinking, yet which when doing philosophy he finds himself quite unable to apply because the picture has no role to play in his ordinary day-to-day dealings with the objects around him or with the thoughts and feelings of himself and of others.
Having divorced himself from the ordinary criteria in terms of which it is usually decided, for example, whether someone is feeling sad or feeling pain, the philosopher is then inevitably forced into a corner in which the traditional sceptical doubt to which he has become subject is interminable, and will remain so because it relies on the picture from which he feels he cannot escape. So long as the sceptic's doubt is thought to be capable of being answered at the level of his denial that there really are physical objects or other minds, e.g., with the Moorean reply that there really are 'items' of these kinds, then the debate will remain 'metaphysical' in a very traditional sense. In fact, a great deal of what the paper is actually saying is incidentally captured by Anthony Kenny a lot better than by the editors, and much more succinctly too in a passage which pretty well sums up the approach that Cakal actually adopts:
In the Tractatus meaning is conferred by pure will, the pure will of the extra-mundane solipsistic metaphysical self; in the Philosophical Investigations it is conferred by the active participation of the human being in the social community in the empirical world. From one point of view the two conceptions could hardly be further apart. But common to both are two theses of fundamental importance (3).
Kenny goes on to explain what these theses are: that introspectionist psychology can never explain meaning, and that the ultimate creation of meaning is indescribable, in the Tractatus precisely because meaning is created 'outside' the world by the metaphysical self, and in the Investigations because it is within a language-game. Cakal is therefore working within a venerable tradition of interpretation, although this does not mean that her account is entirely plain sailing.
It is difficult to see how it could be when concerned with passages which have proven to be some of the most intractable in the Investigations, and many of which are even today still the subject of a substantial degree of exegetical dispute. Take This passage is an invitation to draw a distinction between sensations which in fact do not have any recognised means of behavioural expression, e.g., an unusual tingle or a rather slight pain in some part of the body, yet which could still be subject to a verbal report, and sensations which in principle could not have any form of expression in a public language.
But § 257 is concerned only with the latter. Wittgenstein in effect is not deducing that his child could not invent a name for his sensation because it has no behavioural expression, or concluding for the same reason that he could not explain the meaning of his invented expression to anyone else. He is instead defining a private language in such a way that it can have no relevance to our ordinary talk about our sensations, and one consequence of this is that it can make no sense for the child to invent a name for a new sensation in a private language, something that the child is perfectly free to do as the prior possessor of a public language. We cannot therefore think of the child's sensation in § 257 as having what philosophers refer to as a 'qualitative feel', often regarded as the provider of 'representational content', for that has already been ruled out in connection with the private language even if it retains its usual good sense in relation to the prior possession of a public language.
Cakal's treatment of § 258 also proves problematic for the same reason: it is not so much that what is referred to as 'private ostensive definition' cannot confer meaning on a term for a sensation in a private language because there is no stage-setting providing the framework within which the naming of the sensation would make sense, and in the absence of which it would follow that 'whatever seems right is right'. It is rather that the private language has already been defined in such a way that there is nothing that anyone could conceivably do with it.
What may have the appearance of a reductio argument is not actually undermining presuppositions This is closely connected to the point that there is also something very problematic about describing a private language as one that it is logically impossible for anyone but the speaker to understand. The problem here is that what Wittgenstein is often thought to have proved or shown to be impossible is already -given that it has been so defined that it bears no relation to our talk 13 14 about our sensations -hovering over the edge of unintelligibility. It gains what meaning it has because we know what it is to use a language, and because we know what it is to do so privately in some generally acceptable sense, so that an element of intelligibility appears to accompany the idea of a language which it is 'logically impossible' for anyone but the speaker to understand.
The value of Cakal's paper with its highly traditional approach to these questions is that it helps to remind us that Wittgenstein's method can be seen not to be employing a reductio ad absurdum form of argument. He rather defines a radical privacy which in his dialogue he internally undermines. The idea that there could be a 'third Wittgenstein' is therefore 'grotesque' (Ibid., 92), a 'dangerous historical distortion' (Ibid., 93), so that it would be absurd to support a proliferation of Wittgensteins based solely on the idea that only three times in On Certainty does there occur the idea of a 'hinge-proposition' (Ibid., 94), in § 341, § 343 and in § 655. This would tend to suggest that he is taking the notion of a hinge-proposition together with the major part of the discussion in
On Certainty itself, to be the main justification for introducing the idea of a Third Wittgenstein; and whilst this is perhaps a little misleading considering the volume of work produced in these final years, this need not in itself be assumed to seriously damage his case that the textual basis for referring to this individual is rather slender:
...but the truth remains that as far as textual support of the idea of a third
Wittgenstein is advocated the stuff is rather meagre. This has not prevented scholars like D. Moyal-Sharrock, G. Baker and R. Harre from ascribing on that basis speculative aims to a supposed 'third Wittgenstein'. I think that, regardless of how fine exegesis and analyses in favour of such an idea could be, the project itself is from the start utterly misguided and makes Wittgenstein incoherent (Ibid., 95).
Tomasini Bassols makes great play with the idea that Wittgenstein is concerned in
On Certainty with questions of objective doubt and certainty, but not of meaning, although this is expressed in a way which renders the point he is trying to make difficult to follow:
Contrary to what has been held, for instance, by D. Moyal-Sharrock, bedrock propositions like 'I've never traveled beyond the solar system' or 'I had parents too' do not determine the meaning of any sentence whatever.
The issue has nothing to do with meaning, with the bounds of sense, with definitions, etc., but with classes of beliefs, with kinds of knowledge.
The whole discussion is epistemological, not semantic. In On Certainty, to it that is so obviously wrong, given that he has his own ideas about the nature of these 'propositions of our linguistic background', propositions which 'make our conception of reality coherent', and which are impossible to question. Although at this point he provides a clue which helps to identify the principal feature belonging to hinge-propositions as understood by his adversaries, to which he so strongly objects:
That is, even though there is a sense in which we can say that they are assumed or presupposed, in the everyday practice of language they are not required at all. They simply serve to complete a picture.
It is in this sense that what we say epistemologically depends on them.
It is not the case that for what we say to be meaningful they have to be true; it is rather that for what we say to be understandable and not be a simple brushstroke on a canvass [sic.] that they have to be there (Ibid., 112).
This suggests that Tomasini Bassols is opposed to any thought that Wittgenstein in
On Certainty is providing hinge-propositions as an element in a kind of 'foundationalism' that is intended to act as a bulwark against scepticism, a view it would appear that he wants to attribute to those philosophers who are in favour of promoting the idea of a Third Wittgenstein. Yet if we actually study the outlook to which at least some of these philosophers actually adhere, it turns out that they choose not to regard 'hinge-propositions' in this way at all. Here, for example, is (4) On her view, the consequence of this is that one of the most enduring problems of epistemology has actually been (dis)solved so that 'the unfounded foundation of our beliefs is elucidated' (Moyal-Sharrock, Ibid.) Yet despite the fact that Tomasini Bassols comes to describe the hinge metaphor as the least fortunate that Wittgenstein ever coined (Ibid., 113), because of its apparent associations with foundationalism, it may be thought that there is a certain irony in the fact that he comes to talk about this metaphor in a way which paradoxically appears to be leading him if slowly in the direction of 'hinges' which are not propositional after all. The 'propositions of our linguistic background' have the appearance of tautologies insofar as they could not possibly be false, and they play no role in our ordinary language-games. Their function is not empirical but rather systematic or structural, and although their number is indeterminate, they 'make themselves felt' even if in practice we are only rarely willing to bring them to light (Ibid.) This expression of what has come to be known as an objective certainty which is evidently non-epistemic, may be taken to illustrate how the enigmatic quality scholars often find in On Certainty can succeed in driving commentators, despite themselves, in directions and towards conclusions to which they may on the surface even believe that they are opposed. So when at the end of his paper he confirms that he has been spending his time arguing against the idea of a Third Wittgenstein with all that this may be taken to imply, whilst drawing our attention to 'the fundamental propositions which constitute our conception of the world,i.e., our Hacker, with its concise description of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the idea that the logico-metaphysical form of things had to be mirrored in the syntax of any possible language, to the idea that this is nothing but the shadow cast by grammar.
The issues upon which Hertzberg wishes to disagree with Hacker, however, are rather more subtle, and turn amongst other things on Hacker's use of the term 'concept'. Hertzberg, for example, takes issue with talk about concepts as the product of social interaction, when it is only within the context of social interaction that concepts achieve their proper and sole role as an integral part of human intercourse. The following passage provides an informative picture of the direction in which Hertzberg is heading:
Consider, say a child learning to ask for a drink of water. This is hardly to be understood in terms of the child's recognizing that she is thirsty, then developing a technique for setting in motion a process that will ultimately lead to her having her thirst quenched; rather in learning to ask for a drink the child develops an understanding of what it means to be thirsty. This is part of the story: there is of course an element of reciprocity in learning to understand about thirst: I do not know what it means to be thirsty unless I realize (whether I act on it or not) that someone else's expression of thirst may involve a call on me to give him something to drink (Ibid., 121).
The conclusion that Hertzberg wishes to draw from this is that the meaning of the concept of thirst becomes incorporated into the child's life to the degree that there is no element of this meaning which is separable from 'the forms of social interaction' in which the word 'thirst' finds its application. On Hertzberg's view, therefore, it is simply not illuminating to talk of learning to express thirst in terms of the acquisition of a technique for achieving certain ends. Yet it is worth pointing out that when I train my dog to tell me when she is thirsty by, say, getting her to draw my attention to the fact that her water bowl requires to be filled, what she has succeeded in developing is exactly that: a technique which enables her to quench her thirst. All that this may be taken to show, however, is that Hertzberg is correct in his implicit recognition that my dog is not a human being and does not perform the role in human society of a language-learning child. The human partnership with the dog is, after all, partly if not wholly one of satisfying its need for food and shelter.
The central point here is that whilst we are quite happy to talk about satisfying the dog's needs and wants, and about its ability to express its feelings in its behaviour, whilst accepting that it possesses a 'language' only insofar as this could be construed as a very primitive form of communication, we are not prepared to regard the child as a person, ie., a fully developed human being, in the absence of its possession of at least a spoken language. It is therefore interesting to note that Hertzberg in developing his complaint, treats Hacker's reference to 'learning of concepts as the learning of a technique, in citing imitation, repetition and recognition as central to become a speaker' (Ibid., 124) as an illustration that language as Hacker pictures it has the appearance of a surface phenomenon, a mere set of conventions that might, as Hertzberg puts it, 'be skimmed off life like a cream'. For Hertzberg, speaking develops organically within the life of the child.
This is a theme which he develops in the final part of his paper when he further criticises Hacker's description of the philosopher as someone who sketches the 'logical geography of those parts of the conceptual landscape in which we are prone to lose our way' (Ibid., 124).
Hertzberg's complaint is that Hacker in referring to philosophy's invitation to get us to realise how we are misusing words, is wrongly taking philosophical confusion to be a feature of the ordinary use of language, whilst Wittgenstein makes it clear that it is reflection upon this use which gives rise to philosophical 'problems'. A misleading picture of the 'mind', say, as a kind of ghostly entity 'behind' ordinary behaviour may very well accompany our talk about other people's feelings -our ordinary use of the relevant concepts -but this picture plays no role in our ordinary discourse, although it can provide the seed for philosophical reflection and therefore for a problem about the existence of 'other minds'.
Hertzberg identifies Hacker's failure to distinguish between ordinary use and philosophical reflection on what may accompany that use, with his apparent belief that the philosopher's 'mapping of the conceptual landscape' is actually implicit in the child's learning of a language. On this view, it nevertheless requires the philosopher to reveal what is really to be discovered by inspecting the 'logical geography' of our concepts, a 'geography' enshrined in the 'maps' that his analysis allows him to inspect. As an account of Wittgenstein, this is surely mistaken, although whether it really ought to be attributed to Hacker is another question.
Hertzberg also interestingly throws doubt on the philosophical relevance of what may appear to be Hacker's bizarre example of the difference in use between 'nearly' and 'almost' : Hacker argues that 'there isn't nearly enough sugar in the pudding' would be recognised by competent English speakers to be correct, whereas 'there is not almost enough sugar in the pudding' would be instantly taken to be wrong, a pointer to how the philosophical knots that we tie in our understanding can come to be unravelled. But apart from the issue of philosophical relevance, which Herzberg is arguably right to raise, examples of this kind taken from day-to-day usage are always inherently problematic. To tell chef that there is almost enough sugar in the pudding would be more than acceptable, and there would be nothing wrong either, as
Hacker implies, with saying that the pudding contains nearly enough sugar. If it does not seem 20 21 correct to say 'not almost enough', then 'almost but not quite enough' is acceptable in its stead, although just why one phrase should sound acceptable and another not is hardly a matter to be pursued in a philosophical context. It would be true to say that Hertzberg's paper possesses the virtue of pointing in so many different and rather interesting directions that it would be impossible to adequately pursue all of its ramifications in the short space of a review. By its very nature, however, the paper will tend to be of interest only to those philosophers who have some familiarity with what has now become a very specialised field.
Whilst the papers in this volume do vary in quality, they nevertheless, if sympathetically approached, manage to illustrate how extraordinarily wide-ranging Wittgenstein's thinking actually is. It ought to be emphasised that one or two of them, e.g., Lars Herzberg's, do not illustrate the quite appalling standard of proof-reading to which attention has unfortunately had to be drawn;
and even when they do, the reader can still obtain a great deal of food for thought from reading between the lines.
